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IN THE SUPREME COURIT 
of the 
,STAT'E OF UTAH 
GLEN A. HATCH and EDITH E. 
HATCH, 
Plaintiffs a.nd Appellants, 
-vs.-
W. S. HATCH CO~IP ANY, a corpo-
ration, and WILLARD S. HATCH, 
Defendants awd Respondents. 
Case No. 8215 
BRIEF O·F' RE'SPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is a suit wherein plaintiffs seek to enjoin the 
operation of defendants' trucking business because, it 
is alleged, the noises incident to the repairing and greas-
ing of trucks, changing of tires and running of motors 
constitute an actionable nuisance. Glen A. Hatch and 
Williard S. Hatch are brothers and in possession of ad-
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joining property situated in Woods Cross, Davis County, 
Utah, which locale, with its Phillips Petroleum Refinery, 
1s one of the most highly industrialized areas in the 
state. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Parley E. 
N orseth, sitting without a jury, and after presentation 
of both plaintiffs' and defendants' evidence and a 
thorough view of both parties' premises, the court found 
as a matter of fact that no actionable nuisance existed. 
During the trial court's inspection of defendants' garage 
and repair shop the several operations of greasing, tire 
changing, poun'ding on tanks and driving a diesel tractor 
around the yard were demonstrated to the court. In all 
fairness and justice to both plaintiffs and defendants, the 
court reached the conclusion that the noises were not un-
reasonably loud and in view of the industrialized char-
acter of the area could not be said to constitute a nuisance 
as they might affect plaintiffs. (Finding of F'act No. 5, 
R .. 14) 
Plaintiffs have attempted to exculpate the far great-
er sources of noise in the neighborhood (Onion Street 
traffic an1d mainline Union Pacific Railroad) an'd have 
ignored the 1nany pTactices and devices employed by W. 
S. Hatch Co. to cut down all unnecessary disturbance. 
Plaintiffs have been entirely unreasonable in their de-
Inands. Th.eir demeanor on the witness stand and tone 
of voice Tn testifying, particularly that of Edith E. Hatch, 
a1nply supports the finding of the trial court that they 
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are "supersensitive to the defendants' activities and that 
this supersensitiveness is occasioned by the animosity 
bet-vveen the plaintiffs anld the defenldant, Williard S. 
Hatch." (Finding of Fact No.5, R .. 14) 
STATEMEN'T OF F'ACTS 
*See Flootnote 
Appellants' brief contends that the findings of fact 
drawn by counsel for the respondents (after the trial 
court published its memorandum decision) do not truly 
represent the situation as it exists; that the actual facts 
have been either misrepresented and distorted or ab-
surdly minimized or ignored. 
From a study of their brief, it is apparent that it 
is not the finldings of evidentiary facts with which ap-
pellants disagree, but the conclusions as to their ultimate 
classification. The trial court concluded that the area 
was in fact industrial and that the noises and lights 
complained of were within the bounds of reason. 
It is significant that plaintiffs produced no photo-
graphs, or exhibits whatsoever, to illustrate the area 
involved. The traffic count of trains and trucks which 
pass by their house as revealed by defendants' Exhibits 
Nos. 7 and 8, and the photographs produced by the de-
fendants show the true character of plaintiffs' property. 
*Note: The judgment roll is designated as "R" and the trans-
cript of testimony as '~T", inasmuch as the clerk has not stamped 
the entire record by number. 
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This being a case seeking equitable relief, it is proper 
for this court to review the evidence and determine its 
weight. But as this court stated in the recent Siberian 
Elm case (Cannon -vs- Neuberger et ux. Utah, March 
1954, 268 P2d 425) : 
"However, much consideration 1nust he given 
to the trial court's findings, inasmuch as the pre-
siding judge saw an·d heard the witnesses, had a 
better opportunity to determine their knowledge 
of the fact testifie'd to, to observe their demeanor 
indicating interest pr·ejudice, etc., and particularly 
inasmuch as he went upon the premises in ques-
tion, and m.ade first hand observation of cowdi-
tions existing. Kinsman v. Utah Gas and Coke 
Co., 5·3 Utah 10, 177 P. 418. Kubby v. Hammond, 
68 Ariz. 17, 198 P2d 134. Erickson v. Hudson, 
70 Wyo. 317, 249 P2d 523. Smith v. Smith, Utah 
262 P2d 284." (Emphasis added). 
Never in the history of this court has there been a 
reversal of a trial court's detern1ination upon the facts 
that a nuisance is found not to exist. This is rightly so, 
because the existence of a nuisance depends upon the 
particular circumstances of each case "\vhich must be 
weighed and evaluate·d by the fact finder. The location 
of the property with respect to other industries, the 
characterization of the area, the utility of the defendants' 
conduct, its lawfulness and reasonable operation as com-
pared to the type and gravity of harm to the plaintiff, 
all must be considered. 
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" .... the question whether the excessive 
noises constitute a. nuisance or not would neces-
sarily have to be determined as a question of fact 
and not one of law." Twenty Second Corporation 
of Church of J 1esus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
-vs- Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 36 Utah 238, 
252, 103 P 243, 140 Am. St. Rep. 819, 23 L.R.A., 
N.S. 860. 
As digested and sun1marized below the record in 
this case fully supports the findings of fact that no legal 
nuisance exists. 
Industrialization of The Area 
Within a radius of 500 feet of the center of Woods 
Cross (intersection of 5th South ·street, which is num-
bered from Bountiful and Onion Street; See Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 1) is one of the most highly industrialized 
areas in the state of Utah. Within that area are the main 
line tracks on the Union Pacific Railroad, ( T. 33) ; side 
tracks for switching and for unloading all kinds of p·ro-
ducts from cement and lumber to oil, (T·. 34); the bulk 
of the refinery of Phillips Petroleum Co., including a 
tremendous "cat cracker"; the loading docks, garages 
and storage tanks of Phillips, (T. 35); the heavily tra-
veled Onion Street carrying a tremendous load of vehi-
cles; the old abandoned building of a creamery, (T. 34); 
two street and railroad intersections; each equipped 
with bells and flashing lights for warning traffic, (T. 
37); and the Droubay, Mitchell (T. 36) and W. S. Hatch 
Co. garages for servicing tankers, trucks, trailers and 
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semi-trailers. To the east a fe,v hundred feet and 
crossing plaintiffs' property, will shortly be located the 
ne'v express freeway, carrying the heavy traffic between 
Ogden and Salt Lake City ('T. 46). 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 6, (an aerial photopraph) 
shows the Union Pacific tracks running from Salt Lake 
(upper left hand corner) to Ogden (lower righ.t hand 
corner). The Phillips Refinery and loading docks, and 
the mainline Denver and Rio Grande tracks to the west 
(T. 13) are also shown. Located in the general area is 
a new General Motors plant, and the new terminal of 
the Sinclair Refining Co. (T. 37). Mr. Glen Hatch was 
asked on cross examination : 
Q. "Isn't it a fact then, Mr. Hatch, that your 
home is surrounded on three sides virtually 
by industrial use~ 
A. "Well if you want to call that railroad in-
dustrial use, and this lease_9. property up 
here, (pointing to W. S. Hatch Co.'s parking 
lot), Y·es. '' ('T·. 36) 
'This is the area. No fair-minded person visiting 
Woods Cross would say it was not highly industrialized. 
The trial court visited it and from his view, concluded 
such to be th·e fact. (Memorandum Decision, p·aragraph 
3, R. 9·; Findings of Fact, paragraph 4, R. 13). 
Defendants have never claimed that this industrial-
ization constitutes an absolute defense as a matter of 
law in the instant case, but it does have an important 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
bearing on vvhat is considered a reasonable amount of 
noise and a reasonable use of property. The finding is 
more than adequately supported by the record. 
Phillips Petroleum Refinery and Loading Racks 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 shows the location of the 
Phillips Petroleum Co. refinery and its loading racks 
for trucks on the northwest and southeast corners res-
pectively of the intersection of 5th South Street with 
Onion Street. 
Mr. K. J. Haslam testified (T. 168) that he is Dis-
trict Traffic l\1ana.ger of Phillips Petroleum Co. and has 
been an employee of the company for over five years; 
that the rack for loading trucks hauling gasoline, diesel 
fuel and light fuel oils is north of and almost adjacent 
to the W. S. Hatch Co. place of business; that there are 
t\vo loading racks, a new one being recently completed, 
(T. 172). These loading racks are located 440 feet from 
plaintiffs' house (Def's. Ex. No.1). Mr. Haslam testified 
that Phillips has closed its refineries at Pocatello, Idah·o 
and Spokane, Washington, and has compensated for 
these shutdowns by increasing the capacity of its cata-
lyctic cracking unit at Woods Cross to a possible 10,000 
to 12,000 barrels of crude oil a day, ( T. 17 4). 
The significance of this output is that 90 to 95 per 
cent of the products moving by truck out of the entire 
Phillips Refinery is loaded at th.ese racks, ( T. 173). In 
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the summertime ap·proximately 100 truck~s in 24 hours 
are loade-d out of the area, ('T. 173). The loading racks 
operate around the clock during weekdays and special 
loads are often taken on 'Sundays, (T. 173). 
D·efendant's Exhibit No. 3 is a photograph of the 
Phillips loading racks. The intervening weed patch is 
property belonging to the plaintiffs, ( T. 43). 
Onion 8treet Traffic 
The presence of the Phillips Refinery and particu-
larly the loading racks makes the area a hub for the truck 
transportation of the refinery's products. F'rom plain-
tiffs' house to the center of Onion Street is 72 feet, (T. 
129, Defs'. Ex. No. 1). W. T. Cannon testified that he 
made a survey of all traffic, trucks, trains and automo-
biles passing in front of plaintiffs' house, and this survey 
has been compile'd in bar graph form as defendants' 
Exhibit No. 7. Th.e survey was taken for all 24 hours 
of the day and night, but different periods of time were 
covered on different days and even different months of 
the summer of 1953, ('T. 131). It is representative of the 
large volume of traffic traversing Onion Street. 
The traffic survey in front of plaintiffs' house shows 
that in an average 24 hour day, 904 automobiles and 124 
double gear shift trucks passed the house. Each truck, 
its owner, the direction in which it was proceeding and 
the time of day (or night) are shown on Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 8. All of these trucks. were required to either 
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stop for stopsigns or for the railroad crossing signals, 
and those trucks loaded and proceeding southerly would 
be accelerating in a lorw gear when they passed within 
72 feet of plaintiffs' premises. Such acceleration is much 
noisier than the idling or normal running of a motor. 
Union Pacific Railroad 
The record shows that from plaintiffs' house to the 
first rail of the mainline Union Pacific tracks is 195 feet. 
It is 280 feet from plaintiffs' house to defendants' garage 
(Defs'. Ex. No. 1). The traffic survey indicated that 
during a 24 hour period there were a total of 42 trains 
going north and south in front of plaintiffs' house, (T. 
134), one between midnight and 1:00 A.M., another be-
fore 2 :00 A.M. and three between 2 :00 A.M. and 3 :00 
A.M., etc., ( T'. 134). These trains create such a great 
rumble and roar that while a long freight train is pas-
sing plaintiffs' house it is impossible for two persons 
to carry on an ordinary conversation. It is the great 
noise of the trains and truck traffic that primarily 
prompted the trial court to state in paragraph 6 of its 
Memorandum Decision: 
''And it is the op1n1on of the court further 
that to enjoin the defendants permanently in their 
business activity would be highly unequitable 
and would in fact destroy defendants' business, 
and even if this W'as done, it would not diminish 
to any appreciable degree the noises, confusion 
and .smells which emarnate and exist in this im-
mediate vicinity." (Emphasis added) 
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Mrs. Glen Hatch admitted that the trains could wake 
her up at all hours of the night and that the truck traffic 
was noisy and bothersome, (T. 42). In addition to the 
passenger and freight trains going by, there were two 
periods during the 24-hours of the survey when there 
was switching in and out of th·e Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany. All trains set in motion the crossing signal and 
bells, ('T. 15!5). All of the trains whistled for the cross-
ing, however, Mrs. Hatch stated that the diesels have 
changed their whistles, (T. 88). They now have more 
the sound of a horn. 
Other Garages in the Area 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 is a photograph of the 
l\1itchell Garage, which is about 495 feet from plaintiffs' 
house. The exhibit illustrates the use of surrounding 
property for the parking and storing of trucks and trail-
ers. It is undisputed that the Mitchell and Drouhay 
Garages perform the same type of servicing and repair 
functions as performed by the defendant, W. S. Hatch 
Co. Plaintiffs claim they are not bothered so much by 
the noises coming from these garages but this does not 
detract from the fact that surrounding the Phillips 
loading dock, there is a cluster of garages designed to 
facilitate the road transportation of both light fuel oils 
and heavy black road oils. Regarding the many sources 
of noise, Judge N orseth stated: 
"'The court is not in a. position to determine 
from the evidence ~n this case, or from the phy-
sical factors which are in evidence in the im-
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n1ediate vicinity of the plaintiffs' home, (referring 
to his view of the premises) 'vho is responsible for 
the noises. and smells which emanate and exist. 
It is the opinion of the court that each of the 
businesses· referred to in paragraph- 3 (railroad, 
Phillips loading dock and refinery and Droubay 
and Mitchell garages) contributes to the noises 
and sn1ells which exist." (R .. 10) 
Necessity of Operating Defendant Company's 
Business at Night 
In its operation the defendant company owns ap-
proximately 45 pieces of equipment consisting of 20 diesel 
tractors and/ or trucks and 25 trailers and/ or semi-trail-
ers, ( T. 137-8, 9). In the summer season the company 
employs between 40 and 45 men and at other seasons the 
ernployees rnay get as low as 20 in number, (T. 179-180). 
Plaintiffs primarily complained of the noises which 
-vvere created by the repairing and servicing of W. S. 
Hatch Co.'s trucks. They did state that the lights fron1 
defendant co1npany's garage at night were bothersome, 
but only passing mention was made of any odors. In 
substance this case involves an alleged nuisance by reason 
of noise. The defendants are aware that unnecessary loud 
noises, particularly during the nighttime, can be disturb-
ing. In Benjarnin vs. Lietz, llG Utah 476, 211 P2d 449, 
the high \Vhining sound of a powerful planing 1nill at 2032 
South lOth East was enjoined during sleeping hours by 
the trial court and the decision was affirmed. The opin-
ion states that the evidence showed the noises 'vere of 
sufficient intensity to make normal conversations dif-
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ficult in plaintiffs' hon1es. In Thompson vs. Anderson, 
107 Utah 331 153 P 2d 665 the Supreme Court affirmed 
' ' an injunction which forbade the operation of a power saw, 
the noise of sound equipment and amplifiers, a large 
vacuum cleaner and loud talking and slamming of doors 
during the nighttime. The nuisance occurred at No. 28 
South 4th East, Salt Lake City, in the heart of a residen-
tial area. (The address is taken from respondent's brief 
filed in the Supreme Court of Utah and found in Volume 
556 of Abstracts and Briefs). 
Therefore, defendants were very careful to explain 
to the trial court why it was absolutely necessary that 
defendant company's trucks he repaired and serviced dur-
ing nighttime and the measures taken to keep all noises 
to a minimum at night. 
Mr. Haslam, District T'raffic Manager for Phillips, 
testified that the defendant company is a common carrier 
chiefly concerned with the transportation of "black oils" 
used for road paving; that approximately 50 «yo of its busi-
ness is hauling road oil used for road repairs and new 
construction; that the business is seasonal because such 
paving can only be accomplished in warm weather. Mr. 
Haslam stated that in the summertime, refineries sucli. 
as Utah Oil Refining Co. and Phillips Petroleum Co. are 
hard-pressed to obtain sufficient transportation equip-
ment to haul the black oils; that these companies contract 
for th·e sale of road oil f.o.b. destination and then place 
the order with common carriers such as W. S. Hatch Co. 
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for delivery, (T. 169). At the peak of the hot weather 
season, shippers and road building contractors and every-
one involved in road construction have to contend with 
the shortage of equipment because it is physically im-
possible for any truck operator to keep on hand sufficient 
equipment for the reason that the idle factor is so great 
over the winter; that it is extremely important that all 
available equip1nent be used to the maximum during the 
road building season, (T. 169, 170). 
Then ~Ir. Haslam 'vas asked this question: 
''Q. Now, as a traffic man, what would you say 
about the necessity of dispatching of trucks 
during all hours of the night, where the haul 
is into an area like eastern Nevada or south-
ern Utah or southern Idaho, and the delivery 
is to a road contractor~ 
A. The trucks have to be dispatched on a 24-
hour basis. Otherwise the service of the op-
erator would be of no value, no practical 
value, beyond a very short radius. Source of 
the supply for instance. For instance assum-
ing we have a road job around Twin Falls, 
or possibly Boise or some other place in 
Idaho, and there is a tremendous volume of 
asphalt moves to those areas out of Salt Lake-
Woods Cross region, the time of delivery on 
that job deter1nines the time tha.t the truck 
has to be dispatched from here, making prop-
er allowance for loading time, reasonable 
delays en route, weather conditions, and 
everything considered, so that it arrives there 
at the proper time, and that time isn't set by 
just the contractor's whim or just because 
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he happens to want it there at a particular 
time, those road jobs are supervised by State 
Road Engineers, or city, or whoever n1ay be 
doing the work, and they tell us, when they 
place their order, just exactly when they want 
that truck to be there, and if it isn't there 
he has a crew of men sitting around, some-
times at a cost of possibly in excess of $100.00 
an hour while he is waiting for that truck 
to show up. In addition to his expense the 
State Engineer is on the joh and whoever 
else may be involved." ('T. 170, 171) 
The fact that W. S. Hatch Company must dispatch 
son1e of its trucks at night is best illustrated by a typical 
haul made by it to Wilkins, Nevada, in the summer of 
1953, (T. 140). It is 215 miles from Salt Lake City to 
Wilkins, Nevada, and requires approximately 7 hours 
driving time for the truck to cover the distance. At this 
location a 25-mile stretch of road was being constructed 
with a plant-mix asphalt surface 36 feet wide, (T. 140). 
Deliveries of road oil were made from 5 :00 A.M. to 
12:00 noon. In dispatching its trucks to Wilkins, Nevada, 
W. S. Hatch C'ompany was required to schedule one hour 
for filling the truck at the loading rack of the refinery 
and 7 hours driving time to the point of delivery (T. 141). 
At this job as at all such jobs it was imperative that the 
delivery of road oil not ·delay the construction crew in the 
paving operation; that the oil be hot (between 180° and 
380°) at delivery, ('T. 142). For these reasons the oil is 
hauled in specially insulated tanks and cannot be stock-
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piled at the construction site. Defendants' Exhibits No. 
9 and No. 10 are dispatch sheets for October 20 and J'uly 
17, 1953, respectively. They typify such delivery. 
The defendant company's operation requires. the ser-
vicing and n1aintenance of its trucks on a 24-h'our basis. 
Frank C. Hughes, a -vvitness for the defendants and a 
rnechanic for \V. S. Ifatch Co., testified that he had 
\Vorked all shifts for the defendant company. Mr. Hughes 
said: 
"Q. N o-vv suppose you take the peak of the season, 
when road oil is being hauled heavily, in the 
middle of the summer, will you tell the court 
just what the shift lineup is and how many 
employees -vvork, and when, in the shop~ 
A. Well, at our peak this year we had three men 
on dayshift, three men on afternoon or swing, 
-vvhichever you want to call it, a.nd then we had 
one man on graveyard. 
Q. You only have one man on graveyard then, 
even in the peak season~ 
A. Yes." (T.100) 
* * * 
A. Well, the major repair is done only in the 
daytime. Because on major repair you never 
know exactly what the job is until we get it 
completely tore down, and the position we're 
in out there, we've got so 1nany different 
trucks, so many different models, we can't 
have a stockroom, you know, to cover every-
thing, so when we get it torn down the day-
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shift buys the parts, and the fellows that tear 
it down is on the dayshift and they usually 
p·ut it back together." (R. 101) 
Method of Operation 
·There is no dispute in the record, nor is there any 
claim by plaintiffs that defendant company does any-
thing more than make minor necessary repairs at night 
and that it employs only one man at the peak of the sea-
son to work graveyard shift (from midnight till 8:00 
A.M.) This man takes care of necessary greasing, tire 
changes and minor repairs, (T. 101). In this connection 
Mr. Hughes said that it is the mechanic's duty to check 
over all trucks after they return from a trip and have 
them in good, safe running order and "on the line" for 
the driver when the latter reports for work, (T. 99). 
Trucks are often brought in from one haul at 10 :00 or 
11:00 P.M. and taken out on another trip at 3:00 or 4:00 
A.M. \Vhen a truck driver returns from a trip he hits 
all tires with a bar to see whether there are any flats. 
He checks the oil, water, lights and tires, (T. 9·9). This is 
normally done while the truck is being fueled at the fuel 
pumps just north of the garage. The driver makes a note 
of, and rep-orts any defective equipment to the mechanic. 
If the stalls in the garage are not filled with other equip-
ment, the truck is then driven therein headed east. It 
has never been the custom to park trucks in the stalls 
with the headlights facing westerly toward plaintiffs' 
house, (T. 106). Once inside the garage the mechanic 
checks for broken springs and the amount of grease in the 
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transmission, (T. 100). Finally the truck is parked out 
in the yard (the leased premises from Phillips to the east 
of the garage) where it awaits the next trip. 
Before a truck can be driven out on the road its motor 
must be run for a:bout 20 minutes to build up air pressure 
for the air brakes. But it is not idled nor raced in the 
yard to warm up the motor, for the only way that a diesel 
n1otor can be warmed up is to take it out on the road and 
drive it at least four miles, (T. 102, 105). 
Prior to 1952 it was sometimes very difficult to start 
the diesel engines in the wintertime because of cold tem-
peratures. This difficulty at times necessitated one truck 
pushing or pulling another, ( T. 123) and caused some 
noise. Since the winter of '5·2-53 an electrical device has 
been employed which is a hot water heater, plugged into 
an outdoor wall outlet and placed inside the radiator. 
It keeps the radiator water warm and makes the engines 
easy to start, (T. 101-102). It makes no noise whatsoever, 
contrary to plaintiffs' apparent misinformation, (T. 28, 
122). 
With regard to floodlights, Mr. Hughes testified that 
the company has no yard floodlights and that all night 
work was done inside the garage "because men doing 
mechanical work cannot work with a light in one h·and 
and a 'vrench in the other." (T. 106). He also stated that 
there has never been any steam cleaning of trucks after 
dark at night, ( T. 107). 
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Plaintiffs' counsel, on cross examination of Mr. 
Hughes, elicited the fact that the grease gun is an air-
power driven machine that makes a chugging noise. 
"Just a quick air release is all it is. Just a 
chug. One flip from one valve to another back and 
forth." (T. 114) 
~iinor spot welding on tanks is p,erformed at the garage, 
but all dents that have to be pounded out of the tanks 
are sent to Fruehauf Co., W. S. Hatch Co. does not have 
facilities for straightening dents, (T. 122). 
Specific Noises Complained of and Their Rem,edy 
\Vith reference to plaintiffs' specific complaints ,,~e 
have: 
(1) A claim of pounding a wheel wedge with a 
sledge han1mer in order to get the huge truck tires off 
the wheel. This difficult task of removing a tire from its 
wheel used to be performed manually with a sledge ham-
mer, but to lessen noise and reduce the labor involved, 
defendant company purchased a pneumatic tire changer 
which pushes the tire off the wheel noiselessly, (T. 110). 
( 2) Noise fro1n a pneumatic grease gun. This is 
the ordinary service station grease gun which emits a 
chugging noise as the op·erator releases the air pressure. 
Mr. W. S. Hatch sleeps in his residence immediately west 
of the garage and he stated that at times he could hear 
some pounding, but was never able to hear the grease 
gun, (T. 188). 
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(3) _A_ hissing sound \vhen trucks are stearn cleaned. 
Trucks are stean1 cleaned only in the daytime, ( T. 106). 
( 4) 'The sound of truck 1notors which are idled or 
raced. It is undisputed that a diesel motor cannot be 
\Varined up by racing it. The idling of a diesel motor to 
build up air p1·essure certainly cannot be considered 
legally objectionable in view of the noise of the 42 trains 
and the great n1any In ore truck engines which accelerate 
in lo·w- gear vvhile passing 72 feet fron1 plaintiffs' house 
on Onion Street. 
( 3) General no1se~ fron1 within the shop. Both 
\\~illard S. Hatch and the mechanic, Frank C. Hughes, 
testified that all e1nployees are given strict orders to keep 
the garage door~ dovvn, especially at night, in order to 
1nini1nize any possible sounds, (T. 107, 184). Plaintiffs 
contended that the doors \vere indiscriminately left open, 
but the truth of this Inatter is revealed hy 1\fr. Hughes' 
testirnony on cross exa1nination: 
'"Q. I think you said that you have had instruc-
tions to keep the doors down. Then how do 
you comply \vith this so-called safety require-
ment of opening them up, and how often are 
they opened and closed~ 
A. Well, I don't know an thing about a safety 
requirernent for opening and closing doors. 
I just know when it gets too srnoky in there 
for a man to stay in there. 
Q. Because you're running motors~ 
A. Can be welding. Cutting metal that has oil on 
it. 
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Q. I presume it's cooler with the doors open in 
the summertime, isn't it~ 
A. We never got to experience that much this 
summer on the night shift, because those 
doors was closed just about all summer." 
(T.1115) 
(6) ·Old tires, lumber and junk piled up along plain-
tiffs' boundary line. These items were all cleaned up 
prior to trial, (T. 183). In an area where all sorts of 
trucks, trailers and various other equipment are stored 
(See Ex. No. 3) the p,resence of such objects do not 
constitute an actionable nuisance. This complaint is an 
indication of the aesthetical demands which plaintiffs 
have made upon defendants in an area dominated by the 
railroad and the refinery, et al. Plaintiffs even go so far 
as to request this court to insure the p·ermanence of such 
neatness by issuing a (mandatory) injunction (page 23 of 
Appellants' Brief). It has always been defendants' cha-
grin that th.eir efforts to comply with plaintiffs' requests 
and demands be interpreted not as an indication of will-
ingness to cooperate but merely as an item of some guilt 
on their part and triumph by plaintiffs. Of course, no 
authority has been cited by plaintiffs to the effect that 
an ·injunction will issue to insure a condition that has 
already been voluntarily complied with. 
(7) Lights shining upon plaintiffs' residence. The 
garage building itself deflects all ceiling lights onto the 
ground before they reach plaintiffs' residence. Frank 
Hughes testified that lights inside of the shop can only 
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be seen if a person is standing in line with the door, 
(T. 116). The annoyance of the one or two wall lights 
'vhich shine upon plaintiffs' house could be eliminated 
by dark green shades or venetian blinds. Plaintiffs' con-
tention, at page 22 of their brief, that a total wattage of 
2850 to 3800 watts shines upon their home all night is 
absurd. The witness, E. B. Rawlins, who lives in the next 
house south of plaintiffs', stated that waste gas burning 
atop the Phillips Refinery waste gas stack didn't bother 
him in his house because he kept his shades drawn, but 
at times he had been in his front yard at night when you 
could almost read a newspaper by this burning of waste 
gases at the refinery, (T. 162). The trial court stated 
"that there was no evidence establishing that the de-
fendants had operated large floodlights on the west of 
their (garage) building in the nighttime," (memorandum 
decision paragraph 4, R. 10) and found in its findings of 
fact No. 5 ''that the truck headlights and fixed lights of 
the defendants are not so maintained or used as to un-
reasonably interfere with the use by plaintiffs of their 
residence," (R. 14-15). 
(8) Srnells. Defendants submit that the record is 
so barren of any complaint about odors that the volum-
inous citation of authorities in appellants' brief concern-
ing this subject is completely lacking in factual basis. 
The exhaust from Onion Street traffic and the burning 
of waste gas at the Phillips refinery must be the source 
of this fancied annoyance. 
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DE,CIDED AS A MAT-
TER OF FACT THAT NO ACTIONABLE NUISANCE EXISTS. 
Plaintiffs have devoted the latter half of their brief 
to a citation of authorities which hold that u1zere a nuis-
ance in fa.ct is found to exist, it is no defense: 
(a) That the business is conducted in a lawful, n1od-
ern and efficient n1anner. 
(b) That the noises are necessarily incident to the 
business. 
(c) That the parties are situated 1n an industrial 
area. 
(d) That the plaintiffs moved to the nuisance. 
(Appellants' Brief, pages 41, 42) 
Defendants have never clai1ned that, a.s a 1natter of 
la,v, they were justified in continuing to maintain and 
create an actionable nuisance because of the legal appli-
cation of any of the above factors. No argument of this 
kind vvas evt.:r 1nade to the trial court and such is not the 
contention of respondents on appeal. These 1natters are 
pleaded in defendants' Answer for the reason that their 
presence or absence does have a decided influence in de-
termining 'vhether or not a nuisance in fact n1ay be found 
to exist. 
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·The funda1nen tal issue in this case, as stated by the 
trial court, is \vhether or not the operation of defendants' 
business constitutes a nuisance. In reply to this question 
defendants sub1nitted the follovving authorities to the 
Trial Judge and repeat them for the benefit of this court. 
They announce the universally accepted rule of lavv that 
the creation of a reasonable a1nount of noise does not 
constitute an actionable nuisance. 
"There can be no fixed standard as to what 
noise constitutes a nuisance, and the circurnstances 
of the case must necessarily influ,ence the decision. To amownt to a nu.isa,nce, the noise m.~~;st be un-
rea,sonable in degree, and reasonableness in this 
respect is .a q~testion of fact. No one is entitled 
to a,bsohde q~tiet in the enjoyment of his property; 
he rna.y only insist ~tpon a degree of quietness 
consistent with the standard of comfort prevail-
ing in th"e locality in which he d.wells. The location 
and surroundings must be considered, since noise 
\vhich amounts to a nuisance in one locality may 
be entirely proper in another. The character and 
magnitude of the industry or business complained 
of and the manner in which it is conducted must 
al~o be taken into consideration, and so must the 
character and volume of the noise, the time and 
duration of its occurrence, the number of people 
affected by it, and all the facts and circurnstances 
of the case." (emphasis added) \ 7 ol. 39 Arnerican 
Jurisprudence, Nuisances, Section 47, page 331. 
"Generally, noise is not ex necessitate a 
nuisance even when disagreeable. It has been 
stated that no one is entitled to absolute quiet in 
the enjoyment of his property, but is limited to a 
degree of quietness consistent with the standard 
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of comfort prevailing in the locality in which he 
dwells. Thus it has been held that as many useful 
acts are necessarily attended with more or less 
noise, reasonable noises in an appropriate locality 
are not necessarily nuisances even though they are 
disagreeable and annoying." 66 C.J.'S., Nuisances, 
Sec. 22, Noise P. 772. 
The s.upreme Court of lTtah in applying the above 
stated rule of law reversed a judgment for damages al-
legedly caused by the bad smell, gas and smoke emitted 
from defendants' refining operation in Da,hl v. Utah Oil 
Refining Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 Pac. 269. The Court declared 
the law in Utah to be, that: 
''The right to recover damages for injuries 
occasioned by fumes, gases, dust, smoke, foul air, 
etc., being cast upon one's prop·erty by another, 
in ~roper cases, is well established. But the rule 
of liability is not absolute and the law does not 
afford redress for every such discomfort or an-
noyance. Extreme rights in this regard cannot be 
enforced. Of necessity some d:egree of inconveni-
ence and anrnoyarnce rnust be endu.red or com-
1nunity and social life would' be i1npossible. It thus 
follows that what constitutes in law an actionable 
nuisance is al,vays a question of degree ... " (em-
phasis. added.) 
"While a nuisance, in the ordinary sense in 
which the word is used, is anything th-at produces 
an annoyance-anything that disturbs one or is 
offensive-in legal phraseology it is applied to 
that class of wrongs that arise from the unreason-
able, unwarrantable, or unla,yful use by a person 
of his property. Every person has th·e right to the 
reasonable enjoyment of his property. As to what 
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is a reasonable use of one's property must neces-
sarily depend upon the circumstances of each case, 
for a use for a particular purpose and in a par-
ticular way, in one locality, that would be lawful 
and reasonable might be unlawful and a nuisance 
in another. I Wood on Nuisances (3d Ed.) Sec. 
1, 2." 
This Court IS aware that the volume and type of 
noises that may he considered unreasonable has under7 
gone a steady change which evolution has coincided with 
the increased development of industry throughout the 
country. Thus in Hann:u,m v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 31 Atl. 
2d 99, it was said: 
"No word is used more frequently in discuss-
ing these cases than the word ''reasonable" and no 
word is less susceptible of exact definition . . . 
Noises which in the preindustrial era would have 
been considered intolerably unreasonable are now 
tolerated as reasonable. The noise and smoke of 
railroad trains frequently passing human habita- c 
tions is not now considered unreasonable although 
an equal amount of noise and smoke would doubt-
less at an earlier time have been considered un-
reasonable. That a certain amount of s1noke 
fumes, gases and noises will necessarily be pro-
duced and emitted by manufacturing plants is in-
evitable, but that persons who dwell near manu-
facturing plants like persons who dwell near rail-
roads or on busy city streets must put up with a 
certain amount of resulting annoyance and dis-
comfort is self-evident. The prosperity of an in-
dustrial community depends on its industrial ac-
tivities, and it would be inconsistent with ,sound 
public policy to prohibit these activities at the be-
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hest of a comparatively fe,v 'vho are an~oy.ed 
thereby ... A certain amount of noise also IS In-
separable from industrial activity. The burdens 
of prosperity must be taken with its benefits." 
Throughout the p-resentation of this case defendants 
have contended that what they are doing is R·EASON-
ABLE under the above authorities; that the operation is 
made 1nore reasonable by reason of the fact that it is 
la,vful in the first place (not an outla,ved business under 
the zoning ordinances) ; that it is conducted in a modern 
and efficient 1nanner and hence unreasonable noises have 
been eliminated. The location in the industrial area does 
affect the amount of noise that can reasonably be expect-
ed to exist. Plaintiffs' expensive re1nodeling 'vas pleaded 
bee a use it indicates the fastidiousness of their demands. 
They themselves are obliged to be reasonable under all 
the circurnstances. 
In the Restatement of the La'v on Torts, Sections 826 
to 828 inclusive, the authors of the treatise on nuisances 
have stated that a determination of 'vhether or not an 
actionable nuisance exists, that is whether the acts com-
plained of are reasonable or unreasonable, depends upon 
an evaluation of many factors. The authors conclude 
that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a clain1ed 
nuisance depends upon weighing ''the graYity of the 
harm" to the plaintiff against "the utility of the actor's 
(defendants') conduct." In comment ''b" and "c" to 
Section 826, it is stated: 
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~'b. The point of ·ciew. The unreasonable-
ness of an intentional invasion is detern1ined from 
an objective point of view. The question is not 
"Thether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's or 
defendant's position would regard the invasion as 
unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons 
generally, looking at the whole situation impar-
tially and objectively, would consider it unreason-
able. Regard n1ust be had not only for the inter-
ests of the person harn1ed but also for the inter-
ests of the actor and for the interests of the con1-
munity as a whole. Deter1nining unreasonableness 
is essentially a \veighing process, involving a com-
parative evaluation of conflicting interests in var-
ious situations according to objective legal stand-
ards. 
~'c. 'Gra.vity' of haTJn and 'utility' of co1~ 
duct. The terms 'gravity' and 'utility' are used 
in the Restate1nent of this Subject to express the 
legal evaluation of har1n and conduct. The gravity 
of harm is its seriousness fron1 the objective, 
legal standpoint, while the utility of conduct is its 
rneritoriousness fron1 the san1e standpoint. The 
gravity or seriousness of harn1 fro1n a legal stand-
point is not necessarily the sarne as its serious-
ness fro1n the standpoint of the person harrned . 
.._.\._ person Inight, for exan1ple, regard personal dis-
cornfort or annoyance as a 1nore serious harm to 
himself than the destruction of son1e tangible ob-
ject on his land, whereas the legal serio1tsness or 
gra1;ity of harm throt~Jgh destruction of physica.Z 
things is generally grea.ter than tlze .rrra vity of 
harnt through mere annoyance or discon1jort." 
(emphasis added.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
The Restate1nent then sets forth the follo,ving factors 
which are to be considered in 'veighing the "gravity of the 
harm" against "the utility of conduct." 
"·S·ec. 827. GR.A VITY OF. HARM-FACTORS 
INVOLVED. 
In determining the gravity of the harn1 from an 
intentional invasion of another's interest in the 
use and enjoyment of land, the following factors 
are to he considered: 
r(a) the extent of the harm involved; 
(b) the character of the harm involved; 
1(c) the social value which the law attaches 
to the typ-e of use or enjoyment invaded; 
(d) the suitability of the particular use or 
· enjoyment invaded to the character of the 
locality; 
'(e) the burden on the person harmed of 
avoiding th·e harm." 
"Sec. 828. U'TILITY OiF' CONDUC·T - F·AC-
TORS IN"'\TOL VED. 
In determining the utility of conduct 'vhich causes 
an intentional invasion of another's interest in the 
use and enjo~"'lnent of land, the following factors 
are important: 
(a) social value "\Vhich the law attaches to the 
primary purpose of the conduct; 
(b) suitability of the conduct to the ch.aracter 
of the locality; 
(c) impracticability of preventing or avoid-
ing the invasion." 
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G.ravity of Harm to Plaintiff 
The R-estate1nent rule as set forth above is appropri-
ate and applicable to the instant case. It would be proper 
for this Court, in order to arrive at an equitable decision, 
to weigh these factors as the trial court did, giving due 
consideration to the fact that the Trial Judge observed 
the 'vitnesses' demeanor, viewed the premises and wit-
nessed the deinonstration of the defendants' equipment at 
their garage. The Restateinent forn1ula allows the court 
to 'veigh the gravity of the harm or the seriousness of 
the noises and lights of which the plaintiffs complaip. 
against the utility of defendants' trucking business being 
conducted in the manner, place and for the purposes 
enun1erated. 
It should be noted that plaintiff has not cited any 
Utah cases nor any authority from other jurisdictions 
"~hich hold that noise and lights amount to an actionable, 
nuisance in an industrial area such as the neighborhood 
involved herein. The Utah case of Tho1npson v. Ander-
son, 107 Utah 331, 153 P. 2d 665, occurred near South 
Temple at No. 28 South, 4th East Street, ·salt Lake City, 
Utah, and involved the defendants' use of a sound truck 
with loud speakers, which noise in plaintiff's opinion was 
nine times louder than a radio. This use of the sound 
truck and hammering and slamming noises incident 
to the furniture repair business and use of a large vac-
uum cleaner which gave off a shrill, long, dreary whistle 
'vas enjoined by the Trial Court during the nighttime. 
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The in1portant features of that case are that it was not 
sho,vn that it "\vas necessary for the noises to occur during 
the nighttin1e and the case involved a residential section 
of Salt Lake City, \vhich \vas very quiet except for the 
noise crt:·ated by defendants. Also in BcnjaHzin c. Lietz. 
116 Utah 4-76, 211 P. 2d -±49, the S.upre1ne Court correctly 
affir1ned an injunctive order which prohibited the defend-
ant fro1n operating a planing n1ill situated at 2032 South 
lOth East Street, Salt Lake Cit~T' after the hour of 6:00 
p.n1. on vveek days and all day on Sundays. The resi-
dential area involved, the absence of other sources of 
noise and the non-necessity of operating during the night-
tune Inake it clearly apparent "\vhy these cases cannot be 
considered as a binding precedent in the instant dispute. 
Each case 1nust be deter1nined upon its own facts. 
The extent of the har1n involved in this case is limit-
ed to a distance of less than 300 feet. The only persons 
co1nplaining in this generally noisy neighborhood border-
ing the railroad tracks are the brother and sister-in-law· 
of the defendant, \Villard S. Hatch. nir. R.a,vlings, w·ho 
lives in the first house south of the plaintiffs, says that 
the big,gest noise disturbance co1nes fron1 trains and 
trucks that pass along Onion Street in front of his house, 
(T. lG-±); that the burning waste gas as the Phillips Re-
finery is so bright at times that he can read a newspaper 
in his front yard at night, (T. 162). The trial court at 
' the tin1e of its visit to the pre1nises, heard th'e noises 
1nade by the pounding of a hanuner on a truck and bY a 
diesel tractor being driven about the yard. It conrluded 
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that the noises created hy defendants' operations were in-
~ignificant in eo1nparison \vith the noises caused by the 
h~avy truck travel along Onion Street, \vhich is four 
ti1nes as close to plaintiffs' house, and especially the 42 
trains \Yhich pass daily \Yithin 195 feet fro1n plaintiffs' 
house. 
The har111 caused to plaintiffs can only be considered 
graYe if the eli1nination of the noise \Vould leave plain-
tiffs \vith a rneasurable a1nount of relief. The Trial Court 
coneluded that: 
"' ... even if this \vas done (enjoin the defendants' 
business activities) it \vould not diminish to any 
appreciable degree the noises, confusion and 
s1nells "Thich emanate and exist in this i1n1nediate 
vicinity." (R. 10) 
..:\s for the old tires, batteries, hunher and eoncrete 
blocks \\~hich \Yere piled along the ea~t boundary line of 
plaintiffs' property (290 feet fron1 plaintiffs' house-
<·lcaned up in the sun1n1er of 1953) and \Yhich \vere al-
leged to constitute an eyesore and a nuisance, the rule 
is that: 
"The fact that a thing is unsightly, or that it 
offends the aesthetic sense, 1~ not in itself suf-
ficient to ruake it a nuisance. It has been held, 
however, that while unsightly things are not to be 
banned solely on that account, they should be 
properly placed and not so located as to be unduly 
offensive to the neighbors or the publie, and that 
the fact that a thing is unsightly and offensive 
to the view of average persons 1uay alone rnake 
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it a nuisance "\varranting equitable interference, 
where it is located in a resid.ential district.'' (em-
phasis added) \Tol. 39, Am. Jur., Nuisances, Sec. 
29, Unsightliness. 
Instead of adjusting to the industrial progress of 
the Woods Cross community, the plaintiffs in effect seek 
to have the court turn the community back to a rural 
state. Plaintiff Glen A. Hatch testified that in 1951 he 
remodelled his house, and that the cost of this improve-
ment was $22,000.00 or $23,000.00, (T. 4). The extensive 
remodeling of plaintiffs' house in the face of the develop-
ment of the area is a most unusual and difficult thing 
to understand. Particularly is this true "\Vhen at the same 
time plaintiffs seek to impose their claiined financial 
loss upon the defendants. Of course plaintiffs had the 
right to remodel their home. No one denies that fact. 
In doing so they were fully aware of the industrial 
character of Woods Cross, that the area would becon1e 
further industrialized. Notwithstanding this knowledge 
they elected to reconstruct their hon1e at large expense. 
They must have concluded that continuing to live at their 
location on Onion Street overshadowed in value to the1n 
the disadvantages fro1n living in the industrial area. 
Plaintiffs cannot build a beautiful home in an industrial 
area and then say that they are not to be disturbed. 
Plaintiffs have the duty of 1naking reasonable efforts to 
adjust to the conditions under which they live: 
"IThe harm involved in an intentional invasion 
of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of 
land can sometimes be partially or wholly avoided 
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by the other. In 1nost cases, however, the avoid-
ance of one har1n involves another in the form of 
experience and inconvenience, for the burden in-
volved in avoiding is often as great as that sought 
to be a voided. Nevertheless, there are some si tua-
tions in vvhich one can avoid most of the harm 
from an interference with his use or enjoyment of 
land with very little trouble or expense. For ex-
ample, one may be able by closing the windows in 
his buildin.g to shut out uutch of the noise or 
s1noke from his neighbor's activities. In such 
cases the gravity of the harm is less than it would 
be if the harm were unavoidable or could only be 
avoided with difficulty. . . This factor of the 
burden to the person harn1ed of avoiding the 
harm is not often decisive as to gravity. It merely 
embodies the common sense idea that persons 
living in society must make a reasonable effort 
to adjust their uses of land to those of their fellovv-
men before complaining that they are being un-
reasonably interfered with in what they are do-
ing." Comment on Clause (e) of Restatement Rule 
827. (emphasis added) 
Utility of Defendants' Conduct 
As for the utility of defendants' conduct, the suit-
ability of the road oil transportation business to the 
locality here involved is obvious. There is no place in 
Davis County better suited to the location of the W. S. 
Hatch Company's place of business. The social value 
\vhich the lavv attaches to the purpose of defendants' 
business is important. In our present era of building 
new roads, the transportation of road oil fro1n the re-
finery to the construction site is a necessary and valuable 
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social contribution. F·actor "c" of the Restatement rule 
828 takes into consideration the i1npracticability of pre-
venting or aYoiding the noises and lights of \vhich plain-
tiffs co1nplain. It is undisputed: that it is in1possible 
to limit the operation of defendants' business to the day-
tin1e only ; that the necessity of delivering hot road oil 
at a construction site 1nany Iniles distant fron1 Salt Lake 
City requires the operation of defendants' garage 
throughout the nighttin1e. The changing of tires, greas-
ing of trucks and 1naking 1ninor repairs during the grave-
yard shift are so necessar~T to the business that to enjoin 
the noises incident to these operations \Vould in effect 
enjoin the operation itself. 
The occasional tunes at \vhich lights shine on plain-
tiffs' house cannot be considered n1ore objectionable than 
the lights \vhich shine on plaintiffs' house coming fro1n 
trucks driving up and dovvn Onion Street. The traffie 
survey sho\vs the 1nany trucks \Vhich driYe past plain-
tiffs' house during the nightti1ne. Flrank Hughes testified 
that on a nor1nal night 5 or 6 trucks go through the shop. 
In contrast, in a continuous 24 hour period, 124 double 
gear shift trucks, 904 auto1nobiles and 4~ trains passed 
\Yithin 72 feet to 195 feet of plaintiffs' house, (T. 13-!, 
and Defs'. Exhibit 7). 
It is the general rule that a serv1ce station or a 
public garage located 1n a residential area is not con-
sidered a nuisance unless operated in an arbitrarv and 
ol 
unreasonable 1nanner. 35 ..._\LR 95; 50 ALR 107. Certain-
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ly the noise fron1 the pneun1a tic grease gun and pneu-
lnatic tire ren1over at the W. S. Hatch Co.'s garage can-
not be considered unreasonable when con1pared with the 
noise of trains and trucks passing plaintiffs' house. Con-
sidered fron1 the objective point of view the utility of the 
activity \vhich produce these noises is far 1nore important 
and far overshadows plaintiffs' con1plaints and their de-
sire to be free fro1n such noise. 
In \T olun1e 39 American Juris prudence, Section 4 7 
on Nuisances, it is stated that: 
'"NO ONE IS ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE QUIET." 
Reasonableness of the noise caused by the defendant 
co1npany's operations n1ust be 1neasured by the amount 
of noise other\vise present to disturb plaintiffs. 
~ ·vve have no doubt the appellants have been 
and are annoyed by the noise and vibration of 
defendants' machinery. But the business of the 
latter is a lawful one, and the noises referred to 
appear to be an inseparable and necessary in-
cident thereof. It is not alleged that they are 
either negligent or malicious in their manner of 
conducting their business. It is an i1nportant 
feature in the case that their works are located 
in a neighborhood exclusively devoted to manu-
facturing purposes. In such a location there must 
necessarily be much noise and jarring caused by 
the operation of the 1nachinery, with perhaps 
smoke and unsavory smells, the result of the vari-
ous industries. Admittedly the business of the. 
appellant has not suffered by reason of the acts 
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co1nplained of and so far as the annoyances are 
concerned the~ are to be expected in such a neigh-
borhood a~d must he endured with the best grace 
possible unless valuable industries are to be 
sacrificed for the sake of quiet." Straus v. Barn-
·ett, 140 Pa. 111, 21 Atl. 253 
·Plaintiffs have quoted from a number of cases with-
out stating the facts of the case upon "\vhich basis the 
court's language was 1neant to apply. They atten1pt to 
reverse the trial court's determination that no nuisance 
exists, upon the authority of such Utah cases as Brough 
v. Ute Sta1npede Ass'n. 105 Utah 446, 142 P2d 670; 
Ludlow v. Colorad:o Ani1nal By-Produ.cts Co., 104 Utah 
221, 137. P2d 347, and the two Salt Lake City noise cases 
above referred to (Benda.min v. Lietz, planing mill; 
Thom.pson v. Anderson., radio equipment and loudspeak-
er). 
The noises created by W. S. Hatch Co.'s business 
cannot be con1pared to the widespread fetid stench of 
the animal carcass rendering plant owned by Colorado 
Animal By-Products Co. Nor is there any sin1ilarity 
in the decision enjoining the Ute Sta1npede Ass'n. fron1 
using the street in front of plaintiffs' pre1nises for its 
carnival and thereby creating a situation "There noisy 
cro,vds of people blocked plaintiff's driveway, used vul-
gar language and entered the pren1ises for p-rivate pur-
poses, leaving e1npty liquor bottles and contraceptives 
th.ereon. Each case 1nust be determined upon the basis 
of WH.&T I'S REASONABLE considering all the cir-
cumstances involved in each particular situation. 
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Plaintiffs cite and rely extensively on the case of 
Qu.inn r ... JJnerican Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co. 293 Pa 152, 
1-±1 Atl. 855, 61 ALR 9'18, primarily for the proposition 
that defendants "1nust reduce the noises to the very 
1ninin1un1 \Yhich can be procured, even if it is necessary 
to spend n1ore u1oney in doing so than the appellants' 
property is \Yorth." (page 1-± of appellants' brief). They 
state at page 23 of their brief that an order should be 
issued requiring defendants to 1nove or change the loca-
tion of their garage, referring again to the Quinn case. 
The Quinn case is markedly distinguishable as a 
nzatter of lau·! There the trial court did find as a matter 
of fact that an actionable nuisance existed but dismissed 
plaintiff's bill for an injunction and limited him to a 
recovery at law for whatever damages he had suffered: 
"(2) because more harm would be done by 
granting than by refusing an injunction;" 
The evidence in the Quinn case showed that plain-
tiff \Vas totally blind and lived alone in his residence; 
that defendant's president told him they were going to 
build a plant next door which would 1nake a noise and 
cause so1ne annoyance to him; that defendant offered 
to buy his property but would not allow anything for 
the building on it and consequently plaintiff refused to 
sell; that defendants built their plant and located the 
largest and heaviest pieces of Inachinery un.necessarily 
close to plaintiff's dwelling; that the vibration imparted 
to plaintiff's house by the operation of the heavy 1nachi-
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nery "'\Tas so great that pictures and other articles \vere 
shaken fron1 tables, \valls and Inantelpieces, plaster fell 
from the -vvalls and ceilings, and on one occasion a brick 
fell fron1 the chin1ney." The trial court found that "the 
vibrations and noises are unpleasant and at times cause 
a nervous shock to those living within the house and 
they seriously interfere \vith the comfort and enjoyn1ent 
of plaintiff's residence as a dwelling house." But the 
trial court denied plaintiff equitable relief for the reason 
that it would be 1nore expensive ($12,000) for defendant 
to relocate the 1nachinery than to purchase plaintiff's 
property and house. This, said the appellate court, is 
an insufficient reason, for \vhere a nuisance in fact is 
found to exist it cannot "n1ake the slightest difference 
that the plaintiff's property is of insignificant value to 
him as con1pared \vith the advantages that \vould accrue 
to the defendants fron1 its occupation." Defendants haYe 
no quarrel with the principle announced in this case, but 
the facts are totally different. There a nuisance \vas 
found to exist by the lo\ver court. 
This court should adhere to the reasoning of its o\vn 
decisions as enunciated in Da.hl1:. Utah Oil Refining Co. 
71 Utah 1, 262 Pac 269, wherein it was stated: 
''·Of necessitr some degree of inconvenience 
and annoyance n1ust be endured or con1n1unitv 
and social life \Vould be i1npossible. It thus follo\\T.s 
that \vhat constitutes in la\v an actionable nu18_ 
ance is always a question of degree .... 
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"' ... The test of whether the use of the pro-
perty constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness 
of the use complained of in the particular locality 
and in the 1nanner and under the circumstances 
of the case." 
Thus, in Coon v. Utah Construction Co. 228 P2d 997, 
the conclusion of the trial court was affirmed that no 
actionable nuisance existed although findings of fact 
\Vere entered that the plaintiffs were annoyed by the 
operation of the defendant's Euclid trucks upon the 
high,vay adjacent to plaintiff's house. 
Plaintiffs claim that their action is brought under 
the authority of 78-38-1 U.C.A. 1953, but as pointed out 
in the Siberian Eln1 case (Cannon u. Neuberger 268 P2d 
4:25) this statute has never been interpreted by this court 
"to mean 'anything a,t all \vhich (is) ,anv 
person considers to be offensire to the senses,' 
etc. Rather it has held that the term 'nuisance' 
is applied to 'the 1tn rca.sonabl e, unwarrantable or 
nnlaufnl use by a person of his property ... " 
(page 425) 
Defendant Co1npany demonstrated and the trial 
court heard the noises produced by the operation of the 
pneun1a tj c grease gun and tire changer, the pounding 
on the trucks and a diesel tractor being driven about the 
~~ard. This first hand opportunity to judge the intensity 
and volu1ne of the sounds produced convinced the trial 
court that such sounds were not unreasonable, nor ex-
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cessively loud, nor unnecessarily created. As stated in 
Kinsman et al 'i~. []tah Gas & Coke Co. 53 Utah 10, 177 
Pac. 418: 
" . . . greater consideration should be given 
to the court's finding by reason of the court's 
opportunity in visiting the plant and vicinity and 
seeing fro1n personal investigation and observa-
tion the conditions that exist there, and deter-
mining whether or not such offensive odors, 
fumes, etc., do emanate from and are allowed to 
escape from, defendants' plant, and whether the 
same p·ern1eate the air about and enter the ho1nes 
of the plaintiffs to such an extent as to render 
said pren1ises uncomfortable and unfit for resi-
dential purposes." 
The defendant co1npany and its president, Willard 
S. Hatch, have 1nade every reasonable effort to keep the 
sounds at a 1ninimun1 that might disturb plaintiffs. All 
1najor repairs are made during the daytime. A single 
1nechanic is e1nployed on the graveyard shift, and his 
duties are lilnited to inspections and necessary tire 
changes. Pounding rarely occurs at night and then only 
when it is necessary to fix a broken spring or 1nake son1e 
1ninor repair. ''Tillard S. Hatch has directed the mech-
anics to keep the garage doors down, although at times 
fumes fro1n l\'"elding beco1ne so severe it is necessary to 
open the doors for ventilation. The purchase of the 
electric hot starts which are placed in the truck radia-
tors have lessened the noise in starting the diesel motors. 
The co1npany e1nployees have all been instructed to re-
frain fron1 steam cleaning trucks or trailers after dark. 
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The purchase of the pneu1na tic tire changer has elimin-
ated 'vhat was at that ti1ne the 1nost objectionable source 
of noises fron1 pounding the wheel wedge with a sledge 
ham1ner. Defendant cleaned up the tires piled next to 
plaintiffs' boundary line but in spite of all their efforts, 
plaintiffs continued to 1nake more and greater demands. 
Frank Hughes testified that one night between midnight 
and 1:00 A.l\L he was alone at the garage when Mr. Glen 
Hatch called him on the telephone. 
"A. The telephone rang and I ans,vered, and he 
asked me what was going on over there, and 
I said nothing. I was in the shop. Wasn't a 
soul moving nowhere. I hadn't heard any 
no1se. 
Q. What did he say~ 
A. He said we was making so 1nuch noise over 
there we was disturbing his sleep over there, 
and his wife was about ready to go mad. 
Q. Was there any noise at all being made in the 
shop~ 
A. Not in the shop, because I was the only em-
ployee there·. 
Q. Or on the premises, to your knowledge~ 
A. To 1ny knowledge there \vas no one else on 
the premises. 
Q. Do you know whether any noise was coming 
from any other source that Inight have been 
irritating ~ 
A. If they had I never noticed it." (T. 109) 
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Plaintiffs are Hypersensitive to 
Defendants' Activities 
It was obvious to the trial court that Edith E. Hatch 
was vindictive in the manner that she testified. She 
stated that the hmn fro1n the refinery did not bother her, 
( T. 81) and that she got used to the noise fron1 the trains, 
('T. 84) and truck8. She attributed all her ills and nerv-
ousness to the activities of the defendants and upon 
cross-exan1ination indicated her animosity to,vard 1\fr. 
W. S. Hatch. 
"Q. N O\Y when you've complained to 1\Ir. W. S. 
Hatch about matters, he's tried to alleviate 
the situation, hasn't he~ 
A. He certainly has not. If he has he didn't do 
much. 
Q. He's tried to be a good neighbor, has he not? 
You don't think that he delights in keeping 
you awake at nigh.t, do you~ 
A. Why should I~" (T. 87) 
Her stubborn attitude and den1anding nature \yere 
evidenced by her testimony concerning the "'veed patch'~ 
'vhich plaintiffs O\Yn on the north side of defendants~ 
property. See Defendants' Exhibit No. 3. 
"Q. Have you seen the fire hazardous condition 
in your own property, there to the north~ 
A. D'O you know why that's there~ 
Q. Have you seen that~ 
A. You call that very fire hazardous~ 
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THE COURT: ~Irs. Hatch, answer his question. 
Q. Have you seen that condition~ 
A. I've passed by it. 
Q. Now I'd like to have you tell me why it's 
there, if you \va.nt to. 
A. You better let somebody else tell you then 
maybe. 
~IR. MOYLE: You may answer. 
A. Shall I tell hin1 ~ 
MR. ~fOYLE: Yes. 
A. All right. We tried to get Phillips to clean 
up this corner here. It was dangerous. If it 
had caught on fire \Vhy it \vould have cleaned 
out the orchard, and we asked Phillips would 
they clean that. They didn't do anything 
about it. They came this year and asked and 
we said clean half, clean up that corner over 
there and we will clean up ours. This is the 
first summer that there has ever been left. 
Other summers it hasn't been there. 
Q. In other words Phillips wanted to clean that 
fire hazard though, in the north, and you have 
placed a condition on it that something else 
be done before you pern1it that; is that right~ 
A. They didn't clean theirs. What was the dif-
ference in ours and theirs'~ As far as fire 
hazard~ 
Q. Did Phillips tell you that was hazardous~ 
A. They didn't say so, no. 
Q. They wanted it cleaned up 1 
A. ·They didn't say it \Vas hazardous. 
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~fR. WILKINS: That's all. 
MR. MOYLE: That's all." (T. 88, 89) 
Plaintiffs in their brief (page 13) state that: 
"If there is any animosity and hard feelings, 
it ap·pears to originate with the respondent W. S. 
Hatch, who admitted that he had made certain 
implied threats when appellants complained to 
him regarding the noise." (R. 192, 193). 
What is construed by plaintiffs as an i1nplied threat 
is the statement of W. S. Hatch: 
"Q. Do you recall a telephone conversation that 
you had with your brother Glen last summer, 
when you stated in substance or effect that 
if Glen was not satisfied with the way you 
are running the business that you'd re-open 
the driveway between the homes and run 
your trucks through there again~ 
A. He said that I had never coop·erated with 
him, never done anything to lessen the noise, 
and I says, "Well, what about leaving the 
driveway~ Do you want us to go back up 
the driveway again f' (between the parties' 
houses). That was an ans,ver to his stating 
we didn't cooperate. He don't give us any 
credit for n1oving out of that lane, and getting 
as far out as we can. 
Q. It wasn't intended then as a threat to re-
op·en it? 
A. No." ('T. 192) 
Incidentally ,Y .. S. Hatch owns one-h.alf of the driveway. 
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_A_s this court \Vell knows, it takes tvvro people to 1nake 
a scrap. Defendant W. S. Hatch does not deny that he 
is presently upset and peeved about being sued by his 
brother. After a history of repeated de1nands for greater 
quiet and futile atte1npts to satisfy plaintiffs' whims, 
it is apparent that plaintiffs hope to drive defendants' 
business completely out of the area; see particularly the 
Transcript of Testimony at pages 188, 189. Th-e filing 
of the cornplaint by one brother against another seeking 
an injunction and $20,000 damages is evidence of ani-
Inosity, and when the trial court listened to the noises 
that were the subject of the suit, it concluded that the 
plaintiffs Inust be hypersensitive to single out for com-
plaint such a Ininor contribution to the sum total. The 
trial court's finding that the plaintiffs are supersensi-
tive to the defendants' activities and that this super-
sensitiveness is occasioned by the animosity between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant Willard S. Hatch is amply 
sustained by the record. 
In Tortorella v. H. Tra.iser & Co., 28-l: Mass. 49'7, 188 
N. E. 25-±, 90 ALR 1203, the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts affirmed a judgment dismissing a complaint to 
enjoin the operation of machinery alleged to constitute a 
nuisance. 
"A noise may constitute an actionable nuis-
ance (citing cases) but it must be a noise whieh 
affects injuriously the health or coinfort of ordi-
nary people in the vieinity to an unreasonable 
extent. Injury to a partieular person in a peeuliar 
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position or of specially sensitive clul,ract.eristics 
will not render the noise an actionable nuzsa;nce." 
(emphasis added) 
This rule relating to the materiality in a nuisance 
case of special sensitive characteristics on the part of the 
plaintiffs is expressed in Section 31 of \-r ollune 39, An1eri-
can Jurisprudence on Nuisances: 
"Effect on Persons of Ordinary Habits a.nd 
Sensibilities. -The criterion for determining 
whether a particular annoyance or inconvenience 
is sufficient to constitute a nuisance is its effect 
upon an ordinarily reasonable man, - that is, 
a normal person of ordinary h'abits and sensi-
bilities, - and not its effect up:on supersensitive 
persons, those of too fastidious tastes, those in 
ill health, afflicted with disease or abnormal phy-
sical conditions, or, on the other hand, those who 
are hardened or inured to annoyances or disturb-
ances of the kind in question .... " 
The n1anner in which plaintiffs belittled the obvious-
ly noisier truck traffic on Onion Street and the rumbling 
din of the passing trains supports the opinion of the 
trial court "that the plaintiffs are hypersensitive to 
defendants' activities ... " 
NO PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID BEFORE THE 
WITNESS, GLEN A. HATCH, WAS ASKED TO S'TATE HIS 
CONCLUSION AS TO DEPRECIATION IN HIS RESIDENCE 
PROPERTY VALUE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
THE COURT PROPERLY STRUCK THE TESTIMONY 
OF CHARLES A. LARSON BECAUSE OF HIS TOTAL LACK 
OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING DEFENDANTS' OPERA-
TIONS. 
Plaintiffs cite in their brief the lTtah case of Ludlow 
vs. Colorado Anima,Z By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 
P2d 347, "\vhich expresses the correct rule of damages to 
be applied where there are Inultiple sources of smells or 
noise, etc.; to-\vit, "the difference in 1narket value of each 
tract \Vith its improvements without the stench nuisance 
existing as con1pared with the value as affected by such 
odors." 
The question asked Glen A. Hatch and the objection 
n1ade were as follows: 
"Q. And what a1nount in your opinion \vould your 
residence property be depreciated in the event 
that this nuisance should continue unabated~ 
~IR. WILKINS: Now I object to that question, 
no foundation having been laid for any an-
swer from the witness. 
THE ,COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
MR. MOYLE : I think Your l-Ion or should take 
into consideration the fact that he is also an 
owner of the property. 
THE C·OURT: Well, I think the objection is well 
taken to the question at this time. You 1nay 
qualify if you can do so. You may qualify 
or do as you like, if you want to do so. 
~IR. MOYLE: I won't attempt to go further. 
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THE COURT: You can connect it up further on 
if you'd like. 
~IR .. MOYLE: I n1ay be able to do that." 
The objection was made because plaintiff's counsel 
did not lay a proper foundation for the witness to answer 
the question. The witness was simply asked to state his 
conclusion as to ho"\v much the p-roperty 'vould depreciate 
if the claimed nuisance should continue unabated. This 
is a far different question than one which would be based 
upon market value without the nuisance as compared 
with market value under the nuisance. The court at-
tempted to guide counsel in reframing the question, 
stating that the witness would be allowed to ans,ver with 
the pToper basis shown, but the matter was dropped. 
With reference to the witness, Charles A. Larson, 
there would have been two grave errors co1nmitted by the 
court had the court permitteu the witness' testimony to 
stand. These errors are: (1) The witness 'vas so con-
fused about the operations and noises involved and the 
properties being referred to that there could have been 
no reliance upon any values or amount of damages that 
he might h·ave fixed. For example; (a) He thought the 
Mitchell and Droubay Garages and parking lots belonged 
to defendants, (T. 52). (b) He was not familiar with 
the new Phillips loading rack located to the north of the 
defendants' prop·erty, ('T. 52). (c) He assumed that oils 
are loaded upon the defendants' p·roperty, (T. 57) and 
based son1e of his determinations upon that assumption, 
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\vhen as a 1natter of fact no oils are there loaded, (T. 59). 
(d) He \Vas unable to give any breakdown as to the 
contributing factors in depreciating the property such 
as the railroad, the Phillips Refinery, and the other in-
dustries in the area. It was evident that this so called 
expert had u1ade only a cursory examination of the area 
involved and \vas not sufficiently fa1niliar \vith it to 
testify as to w·hat activities defendant controlled and 
\Yhat its contribution to the sun1 total of noises amounted 
to. 
( 2) Aside fro1n all this, ho\vever, the witness \Vas not 
testifying as to market values but was testifying as to 
''replacement costs." 
"Q. Now when you fix the replacement value that 
value didn't take into consideration the fact 
that on July 9, 1953, that W. S. Hatch was 
already operating th.ere, did it~ 
.. A.. No. That was replacernent value. 
Q. So you don't mean to say that that was the 
value of the property as of that date? 
A. I said that was a replace1nent value. 
Q. That's nothing but a contractor's construct-
ing figure, isn't it? 
A. That's right." (T. 65) 
This witness was unable to g1ve any figure that 
would rnake proper allowance for the variation in rnarket 
values due to the numerous industrial influences in the 
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neighborhood. As a 1natter of fact defendants atten1pted 
to have this \Yitness give a breakdown on the contributing 
factors influencing value and he finally confessed that 
he could not do so. 
"Q. Well then, you can't give 1ne any overall 
breakdown. Is that what it comes down to? 
A. Just an estimate. What I thought the house 
could sell for with all of those in there in a 
lump sum. 
Q. Well, can you break them down or can't you~ 
A. I cannot break them do,vn right now." (T. 69) 
As a matter of fact this witness testified that land 
values would increase with industrialization. 
''Q. Are you familiar with the new highway that 
is pTojected at the back that's going across 
there~ 
A. I don't know the location of it. Just general. 
Q. Well, let's assume that its about 1200 feet 
from the- garage of W. ·s. Hatch up to the 
center line of the new highway. 'Vould that 
have an influence if that freeway co1nes 
through, \Yould that have an influence on 
values~ 
A. I think that''s going to help all that lower 
country become 1nore industry. 
Q. The future of this area is industry isn't it, 
Mr. Larson~ 
A. I think so. 
Q. It's not residential~ 
A. I think not. 
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Q. It beca1ne that way not through W. S. Hatch's 
operation did it~ 
A. No. People moving into it all the time. One 
company doesn't 1nake all of the industry." 
·(T. 64-65). 
Plaintiffs' cases relating to e1ninent domain pro-
ceedings are inapplicable in a nuisance case. For there 
the rnarket value of the property at the time it is taken 
is the single matter in issue and in the instant case, it 
is necessary for a witness to have a basis for his testi-
Inony as to how 1nuch the claimed depreciation of pro-
perty can be attributed to any of the 1nany causes in the 
vicinity. 
In any e cent these rulilngs on the evidence concerning 
da1nages are not preju.dical error, being made in a case 
tried without a ju.ry wherein it was found thal no action-
able nuisance exists. 
CONCLUSION 
When the trial court visited the premises and heard 
the sounds produced by a mechanic pounding on a truck 
frame, the operation of the pneumatic grease gun and 
tire changer and the noise produced by a diesel tractor 
driving about the yard, the court must have been im-
pressed with the fact that the noises were not loud, and 
in cornparison with the sounds from Onion Street traffic 
and the railroad were not of such volume to constitute 
a nuisance. 
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The 1nost that can be said for plaintiffs' position is 
that there is some conflict in the testi1nony as to the 
facts. While this is an equity case, nevertheless the trial 
court visited the premises in the presence of counsel, and 
observed the derneanor of the witnesses, and particularly 
those who showed animosity. An appellate court is at a 
disadvantage in all of these things because the written 
record may not truly reflect them. It is for this reason 
that appellate courts in nuisance cases are reluctant to 
overrule a trial judge's finding that no nuisance exists. 
It is for these reasons that the Supreme Court of Utah 
in no case has reversed the decision of a trial court find-
ing the absence of a nuisance. 
The record is replete with instances of defendants' 
good faith in minimizing objectionable noise. If an in-
junction were ever issued to restrain defendants in any 
of their alleged noise-1naking activities, plaintiffs would 
listen harder than ever in order to obtain an order of 
conten1pt and thereby embarrass defendants. This case 
of disturbance and annoyance has a 1nore fundan1ental 
cause than the noi'Ses plaintiffs claim emanate from their 
brother's business. This is a case where no actionable 
nuisance has been found by the fact finder, and one which 
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does not deserve the enforce1nent arm of the law. It is 
submitted that upon the record and in accordance with 
the best interests of wisdon1 and justice, the decision 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully subrnitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & C'ANNON 
C. W. WILKINS 
RICHAR.D H. NEBEKER 
Cownsel for Defewdatnts and 
Respondents 
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